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ABSTRACT
Accessing public Wi-Fi networks can be as dangerous as it is convenient. People who access a public Wi-
Fi network should engage in self-protective behaviors to keep their data safe from malicious actors on 
the same network as well as persons looking over their shoulder, literally and proverbially. Using two 
independent research designs, we examined under what circumstances were people more likely to 
access an unsecured Wi-Fi network and engage in risky behavior on these networks. Findings from the 
first study, based on survey data, reveal that people who are more situationally aware are less likely to 
access personal accounts on public Wi-Fi, and more likely to cover their screen to prevent others from 
viewing personal information. Additionally, findings show that people with higher computer 
proficiencies are less likely to engage with public Wi-Fi. For the second study, our research team 
designed and deployed honeypot Wi-Fi networks. We found that people are more likely to access these 
unsecured, rogue networks in establishments with fewer on-duty employees and that do not offer 
legitimate public Wi-Fi. Additionally, the number of on-duty employees is associated with an increase 
in physical security behaviors, such as concealing a screen. We conclude by discussing how these 
findings can aid in reducing susceptibility to online victimization.
Introduction
Public Wi-Fi networks provide a convenient, cost-effective way for accessing the Internet in areas 
where a wired infrastructure is challenging. This convenience resulted in public Wi-Fi networks 
appearing in public places in substantial numbers in recent years. In most cases, these wireless 
networks do not require any form of user authentication or identification for using them (Zafft and 
Agu 2012). This makes users vulnerable to privacy and security attacks. Additionally, wireless signals 
leak beyond buildings in which access points are installed, so intruders can pick up these signals from 
parking lots or nearby buildings (Zafft and Agu 2012).
A recent global survey found that among one hundred information technology security leaders, nearly 
three-fourths report that they suffered a breach as a result of a mobile security issue, with thirty 
percent of the breaches caused by unsecured wireless connections (Cockerill 2015). Another study 
found that ninety-two percent of Americans have put personal information at risk, including their 
bank account details, by transferring sensitive information over public Wi-Fi (Norton 2017).
Users are often encouraged to restrict their web traffic to information that is not considered sensitive 
(e.g., avoid submitting financial information, usernames, and passwords). For instance, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) encourages public Wi-Fi users to take specific precautions while using these 
networks. Users are instructed to use encrypted Wi-Fi networks, only enter personally identifiable 
information on secured networks, use Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections, and avoid sending 
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emails containing personal information (Rouge 2017). A few experts go further, suggesting that since 
malicious Wi-Fi networks could be easily deployed by criminals (Zafft and Agu 2012), users should 
completely avoid online banking and accessing sensitive data over a public Wi-Fi network, even if 
these websites are encrypted (Conti et al. 2016). Many websites that request users to submit sensitive 
data use Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) to ensure transferred data is encrypted. 
However, HTTPS over a public Wi-Fi network can be compromised relatively easily and is not 
recommended as a complete security solution (Krebs 2012).
Despite the continued efforts to improve public Wi-Fi users’ awareness of these hazards and the 
security measures that they need to take (Holt and Bossler 2014; Norton 2017), a significant amount of 
users continue to put their security at risk by submitting sensitive data both in public and over 
unsecured Wi-Fi networks (Norton 2017). The security threat is particularly significant while using 
public Wi-Fi networks because users must contend with potential offenders on the same network and 
in the public space around them (Eiband et al. 2017), which are respective instances of “online” and 
“offline” behaviors.
Regarding the latter, “shoulder surfing” is observing other people’s information without their consent 
(Eiband et al. 2017). This has become a much greater threat due to the prevalence of mobile phones 
equipped with cameras and video recorders (Eiband et al. 2017). Thieves can covertly snap pictures of 
credit cards, credit applications, or record entire conversations while appearing to be texting or 
talking on the phone (Brudy et al. 2014; Honan 2012). At its core, protective behavior involves 
positioning the screen so that information is not viewable by others (Brudy et al. 2014). The literature 
shows that self-protection is effective at preventing victimization (Bachman et al. 2002).
Situational Awareness (henceforth SA) includes being mindful of the surroundings and identifying 
potential threats and dangerous situations. It may be important in determining network users’ 
adoption of self-protective behaviors, and consequently mitigating the threat of online crime over 
public Wi-Fi networks. Specifically, it is possible that being aware of the physical surroundings plays 
into a person’s decision-making and threat perception (Endsley 1995; Klein 1989) and leads to self-
protective behaviors.
This article examines SA in shaping public Wi-Fi users’ adoption of self-protective behaviors while 
using public networks, including whether environmental cues (e.g., place managers or on-duty 
employees) encourage users to be more aware of their security and be more protective. We draw on 
the Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) perspective to understand how users protect themselves while 
using public Wi-Fi networks. We consider whether SA and place management can be used to increase 
our understanding regarding peoples’ decisions to employ self-protective behaviors while using public 
Wi-Fi networks.
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The next section introduces the relevance of self-protective behaviors in reducing people’s likelihood 
of becoming a crime victim. It also discusses the impact of SA and place management on both online 
and offline self-protective behaviors. That is followed by a description of the two studies we 
conducted. Finally, the results are presented and discussed.
Theoretical Background
Victim Self-Protective Behavior
Broadly speaking, criminologists differentiate between two major types of Victim Self-Protective 
Behavior (VSPB): forceful and non-forceful resistance. Forceful resistance refers to active aggressive 
behaviors like pushing, biting, and kicking, that are introduced by a victim directly against a 
perpetrator in order to prevent an act of crime (Ullman 1997). Non-forceful resistance, on the other 
hand, refers to passive resistance techniques that are used by a victim to avoid offenders, and 
consequently, reduce the probability of a criminal event (Guerette and Santana 2010). Examples of 
behaviors that could be classified as non-forceful strategies include avoiding an offender, escaping, 
pleading, and begging. A majority of VSPB research has focused on types of self-protective behaviors 
that are most effective in preventing rape completion (see Ullman 2007 for a review of the literature), 
other studies demonstrate how resistance can decrease the likelihood of other forms of victimization 
such as domestic violence (Bachman et al. 2002) and robbery (Guerette and Santana 2010; Ziegenhagen 
and Brosnan 1985) from being completed.
More recently, scholars have examined self-protective behaviors employed by victims of various forms 
of cyber abuse. Fissel (2018) operationalized self-protection as reporting victimization experiences to 
the police, whereas Worsley et al. (2016) focused on the psychological impacts of victimization and 
conceptualized self-protective behaviors as the implementation of various coping mechanisms. Lastly, 
Sheridan and Grant (2007) identified the following self-protective behaviors that people engage in 
when experiencing cyberstalking: changing employment/course of study, getting rid of car, increasing 
security, changing identity, and giving up social activities. Although the literature is expanding to 
include self-protective behaviors used in online environments, Nobles et al. (2014, p.993) accurately 
state the literature “has not developed to the point where patterns in responses to victimization, 
including self-protective behaviors taken by the victim, have been clearly identified.”
The dearth of literature is evident when examining VSPB for more technical forms of cyber 
victimization. One environment in which Internet users are susceptible to victimization experiences is 
when using public Wi-Fi networks. Although criminologist have done little to examine how users of 
public Wi-Fi networks mitigate the risks of untrusted networks, several protective or coping behaviors 
have been identified that reduces one’s risk of being victimized (Klasnja et al. 2009). These tend to be 
solutions in which people can engage in the physical world (i.e., concealing their devices, ensuring that 
others are not sitting immediately next to them, or being cognizant of potentially suspicious people 
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around them (Klasnja et al. 2009)) or in cyber space (i.e., using remote VPN or avoiding accessing 
personal information while on the network). Increasing such behavior and reducing risk-taking 
behavior is of crucial importance for preventing the completion of criminal events (Bachman et al. 
2002). Thus, getting users to reduce their risk online by protecting themselves and their data while 
using public Wi-Fi networks is a key element of reducing vulnerability to cybercrime (Watts 2016). This 
assumption is consistent with Clarke’s SCP framework (Clarke 1980).
Situational Crime Prevention
All in all, the SCP perspective is a preventive approach to crime that relies upon reducing opportunities 
for crime by focusing on the relationship between the offender and the actual environment in which 
the crime takes place. It is a general approach as well in reducing opportunities for any kind of crime 
occurring in any kind of setting (Clarke 1995). The underlying premise of this perspective is that 
criminals are rational beings who weigh the costs and benefits of their prospective behaviors. 
Therefore, successful crime prevention efforts must involve the design and manipulation of human 
environments to make offenders’ decisions to get involved in crime less attractive (Herath and Rao 
2009). Drawing on the routine activities perspective assumption that opportunity is a root cause of 
crime (Cohen and Felson 1979), Clarke (1980) proposes that crime can be prevented by reducing 
criminogenic opportunities in the environment. The opportunity-reducing methods of SCP fit 
systematic patterns and rules which cut across every walk of life, even though prevention methods 
must be tailored to each situation. These methods aim to: increase the perceived effort of crime; 
increase the perceived risks; reduce the anticipated rewards; prevent provocations; and remove 
excuses for crime. For example, reducing rewards entails avoiding sending personal information and 
avoiding accessing sensitive websites, such as banking websites, over public Wi-Fi networks (Reyns 
2010). Increasing the effort for cyber criminals can be accomplished by avoiding accessing unknown 
public Wi-Fi networks, restricting the submission of personal information over Wi-Fi networks, and by 
the owners of the public Wi-Fi setting a password to access the network.
VSPBs in its various forms are of relevance in the context of this perspective since victims’ resistance 
would increase offenders’ efforts to complete a criminal event and offset offenders’ cost and benefit 
calculations (Guerette and Santana 2010). Moreover, victims’ use of non-forceful resistance techniques 
like evasion and avoidance, in both online and offline situations, will remove the victim from the 
criminogenic situation, and prevent the occurrence of a criminal event (Ziegenhagen and Brosnan 
1985). However, we believe that the implementation of self-protective behaviors is dependent on 
potential targets’ awareness of their environment (i.e., their level of SA).
Situational Awareness
SA is pertinent to people who find themselves in threatening situations (Rozee and Koss 2001). The 
concept refers to adaptive, externally directed consciousness (Smith and Hancock 1995). SA generates 
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behavior to achieve a goal in a specific task environment. Its products are knowledge about and 
directed action within that environment (Smith and Hancock 1995). Most importantly, SA endows the 
competence to generate appropriate behavior in response to complex and dynamic situations (Cohen 
and Felson 1979; Klein 1989). This competence is based on long-term memory structures that allow 
people to quickly understand a given situation: A person has prototypical situations in one’s memory, 
with each corresponding to a “correct” action. Thus, in an unfolding situation, a person determines 
how to act by matching its characteristics to a prototypical situation. SA, to be clear, is not a constant 
across people. Some people demonstrate more of it. This may be a function of a person’s information-
processing mechanisms as influenced by innate abilities, experience, and training; or, may reflect 
preconceptions and objectives that filter and interpret the environment (Endsley 1995).
Place Management
The SCP perspective, as stated above, is comprised of measures “(1) directed at highly specific forms of 
crime (2) that involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as 
systematic and permanent a way as possible (3) so as to reduce the opportunities for crime and 
increase its risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders" (Clarke 1983, p. 225). One of the original 
strategies proposed by Clarke (1980) to reduce the occurrence of crime involves the introduction of 
surveillance means. According to Clarke, the introduction of guardians and surveillance means in the 
environment may mitigate crime by increasing offenders’ perceived threat of detection and 
punishment. In general, Clarke and Homel (1997) identify three types of surveillance: natural 
surveillance, formal surveillance, and surveillance by place managers (or surveillance by employees). 
Natural surveillance involves the manipulation of the physical environment in order to improve a 
person’s ability to observe the environment and increase the chance of offenders being detected when 
committing a crime (Welsh et al. 2010). In the offline environment, this can be accomplished by 
improving street lighting and promoting the “see something, say something” agenda. Formal 
surveillance involves the introduction of official forms of crime prevention personnel, such as police 
officers, security guards, and crime prevention hardware such as CCTV cameras, red light cameras, 
and burglar alarms (Clarke 1997). Lastly, surveillance by place managers involves the use of employees 
who have non-security related responsibilities in an organization to also fulfill a surveillance role 
(Chen and Zahedi 2016). Such personnel include building attendants, concierges, park keepers, train 
conductors, and convenience store clerks. A place managers primary responsibility is not to reduce 
crime, but to ensure business operates smoothly through the management of social and physical 
characteristics (Madensen 2007). However, these characteristics are also essential for crime 
prevention, and effective place managers can reduce the opportunity for people to engage in crime.
If networks are places, then network administrators, designers, and facilitators are their place 
managers (Reyns 2010). Managers of online places have a particularly important role in the prevention 
of cybercrime especially when considering public Wi-Fi networks due to their nature (i.e., completely 
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open physically and virtually). Network place managers potentially have great control over what 
transpires within their networks and domains. In addition, they can limit access and set rules for 
participation on the network. As such, their role in preventing online crimes is of paramount 
importance (Reyns 2010).
Further, public Wi-Fi networks have criminogenic properties which make cybercrime possible by 
providing easy opportunities for the crime to occur. Newman and Clarke (2003) describe elements of 
information systems that are themselves conducive to crime using the acronym SCAREM. SCAREM 
stands for Stealth (Internet users can effectively remain invisible while online), Challenge (e.g., 
hacker’s may enjoy the challenge presented by online crime); Anonymity (online environments are 
inherently anonymous); Reconnaissance (the interconnected nature of the Internet makes it possible 
for offenders to scan thousands of servers or computers for loopholes to exploit); Escape (the stealth 
and anonymity aspects of online domains make it easier for offenders to avoid detection); and 
Multiplicity (online domains provide multiple targets). It can be argued that public Wi-Fi networks 
have the criminogenic qualities of SCAREM. For example, public Wi-Fi networks provide not only 
fertile ground for cybercrime to take place (e.g., provides offenders with stealth, reconnaissance and 
escape), but also a wealth of potential victims – all users of the network (multiplicity).
As discussed at the beginning of this section, surveillance can increase offenders perceived threat of 
detection and punishment. Place managers can reduce the attractiveness of a location for criminals 
(i.e., parking lot attendants can alert you of a recent spate of car thefts in the area and encourage you 
to lock your car). Likewise, hotel concierges can alert you to dangerous areas in the vicinity. By using 
place managers in the location of the public Wi-Fi network as sources of information and providers of 
surveillance, users have a point of contact if  they have queries about using the public Wi-Fi network 
(i.e., employees of a public Wi-Fi location can be approached and questioned as to whether there is a 
password for the public Wi-Fi network or whether a specific network that the user is picking up is 
associated to the location or not). Thus, place managers help potential victims avoid the temptation of 
accessing potentially malicious networks in the vicinity. Although the idea of place managers being 
used to prevent the occurrence of crime has a rich theoretical development, it has not been subject to 
rigorous evaluation research (Douglas and Welsh 2020). In fact, in a systematic review on alternative 
measures of surveillance, Welsh and colleagues (2010) only identified two high-quality evaluations of 
the effectiveness of place managers at reducing crime. However, neither of these examinations assess 
the effectiveness of place managers at reducing the opportunity of online crime.
Hypotheses
Based on the above concepts, theories, and findings, we expect to find that when potential public Wi-Fi 
users exhibit greater SA, they are more likely to: 1) Be aware that a public Wi-Fi network is available at 
a place; and 2) Engage in more self-protective behaviors while using the public Wi-Fi network. In 
CrimRxiv Situational Awareness and Public Wi-Fi Users’ Self-Protective Behaviors
8
addition, we expect that public Wi-Fi users in places with more place managers will be enabled to 
engage in more self-protective behaviors. Stated as hypotheses:
H1. People with higher SA are more likely to use public Wi-Fi networks.
H2. People with higher SA are more likely to use self-protective behaviors related to their use of public Wi-Fi 
networks.
H3. People in places with more place managers are more likely to use self-protective behaviors related to their 
use of public Wi-Fi networks.
Analytic Design and Results
To test our research hypotheses, we collected data using two unique research designs. The first study 
applied a survey methodology on university students’ computer and network usage to assess the first 
two research hypotheses. To answer the third hypothesis, we implemented a field study that allowed 
for the collection of public Wi-Fi network packet data across a chosen United States (US) state. All 
statistical analyses in both studies were estimated using Stata/IC, version 15.1 (StataCorp LLC). We 
now present the analytic strategies and results of the two studies.
Study 1
The first study consisted of a year-long survey conducted on the campus of a large US university and 
was approved by the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (350485-1). The survey was 
designed to ask students about their computer and network usage, focusing on areas that could 
potentially compromise the security and integrity of their systems as well as the security of the 
network to which their systems are connected. Students in large introductory courses were recruited. 
During recruitment, all potential participants were explained that participation in the study is 
completely voluntary. Those who volunteered were given a hard copy of the survey and time, in class, 
to fill it out. Our questionnaire was administrated during the academic years of 2014-2015 to 820 
students. Once the data were cleaned, 749 responses were available for analysis.
Dependent Measures
Three dependent measures were constructed from the survey data: Uses Public Wi-Fi Network; Check 
Online Personal Accounts on Public Wi-Fi Network; and Conceal Device Screen While Using Public Wi-Fi 
Network. The first variable, Uses Public Wi-Fi Network, indicates whether the respondent uses a public 
Wi-Fi network. If the respondent did connect to a public Wi-Fi network, they received a value of 1, and 
if not, they received a value of 0. Next, Conceal Device Screen While Using Public Wi-Fi Network indicates 
whether the respondent actively attempts to hide or position their computer screen out of sight of the 
people around them while using a public Wi-Fi network. Those who reported actively concealing their 
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screen received a value of 1, those who did not received a value of 0. The third variable, Check Online 
Personal Accounts on Public Wi-Fi Network, indicates whether the respondent uses a public Wi-Fi 
network to check personal accounts online (0=No, 1=Yes), such as bank accounts or email accounts. 
This measure is our proxy for online self-protective behaviors.
Independent Measures
Independent measures captured respondents’ SA and sociodemographic characteristics. Situational 
Awareness is a single item measure indicating the extent to which respondents were attentive of their 
surroundings while using a public Wi-Fi network. Respondents were presented with the following 
question. “Are you aware of the people around you when you are surfing the Internet while using a 
public wireless Internet hotspot?” Response options ranged from 1 (Not aware) to 5 (Very aware). We 
also constructed key control measures including Male (1=Male 0=Female), Age (In years), Annual Income
 and Programming Experience. Annual Income was ordinally measured using the students’ self-reported 
income with response options ranging between 1 (Below $20,000) to 12 ($220,000 and above). The 
Programming Experience variable was ordinally measured as well and is used as a proxy measure to 
assess a respondent’s proficiency with computers. Response options ranged between 0 (No 
experience) to 3 (Fluent in at least one programing language).
Analytic Strategy
First, we present descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. Next, we estimate the relationships 
between our list of dependent and independent variables using a series of Logit models, while 
controlling for potentially relevant demographic characteristics. Logit models are used to estimate the 
relationships between a list of independent variables and a dependent variable that is binary (0/1) in 
form.
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the variables constructed from the survey data. As shown in 
the table, of the 749 respondents, 23% used public Wi-Fi networks, and 88% concealed their computer 
screens while using public Wi-Fi networks. Additionally, 43% of the respondents who used public Wi-Fi 
checked personal accounts online on the public Wi-Fi network. Over 65% of respondents claimed to be 
aware of the presence of other people in the vicinity while using a public Wi-Fi network. Reflecting the 
fact that the survey was conducted on at a large US university, respondents’ average age is 19.60. 
Furthermore, nearly half of the respondents are male (49%), and 90% reported an income of less than 
$20,000.
--Table 1 About Here--
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Table 2 presents findings estimated from the logit regression analyses. Model 1 of Table 2 reports the 
logit regression results for all participants in the survey (n=749). In Model 1, we see the mean effect of 
SA on the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of 1 (i.e., respondents use public Wi-Fi 
networks) is positive and marginally significant (p<0.10). Male respondents appear to trust public Wi-
Fi networks less (p<0.05). Programming experience has a negative impact on the probability of using 
public Wi-Fi networks (p<0.05). That is, respondents who are more proficient with computer 
programming languages reported using public Wi-Fi networks significantly less. Model 2 of Table 2 
shows that respondents who are situationally aware do not check personal accounts when using public 
Wi-Fi. Again, this result is marginally significant (p<0.10). However, respondents with programming 
experience are much less likely to check online personal accounts while using public Wi-Fi (p<0.01). 
Model 3 of Table 2 shows that respondents who are situationally aware are more likely to conceal their 
screens while using a public Wi-Fi network (p<0.01).
--Table 2 About Here--
Table 3 presents re-estimated results that were generated from Table 2’s Models 3 and 4 to assess the 
robustness of these earlier findings. This was accomplished by restricting the analyzed sample to the 
respondents who admitted to using public Wi-Fi networks (n=164). Model 1 of Table 3 suggest that 
respondents who both use public Wi-Fi networks and practice situational awareness are less likely to 
check personal accounts online (p<0.10). This finding is marginally significant. Similarly, Model 2 of 
Table 3 shows that respondents who are situationally aware are more likely to conceal their screens 
when using public Wi-Fi (p<0.10). This finding is also marginally significant.
--Table 3 About Here--
Study 2
The second study consisted of a separate data collection effort. The following procedure was approved 
by the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (402261-1). Specifically, we set up our own 
private Wi-Fi network at 109 coffee houses, restaurants, and hotels around the state of Maryland. We 
chose businesses that were relatively homogenous in size and customer profile (i.e., users of smart 
phones and/or laptops in order to reduce the possibility of an omitted confounding effect) while using 
a list of businesses obtained from the Maryland Department of Commerce. All selected business were 
located less than 60 miles away from University of Maryland campus. We collected data at each 
business at three periods in a day (Morning, Afternoon, and Evening), for one hour during each period. 
Due to hours of operation, we were not always able to visit each location three times in a single day. 
Five students (one per location) were tasked as research observers and were assigned with the task of 
attending each business and setting up our network. These students went through an hour-long 
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training session in which they were explained how the network should be set up and how they should 
check its functionality.
When a person would look for available Wi-Fi networks, ours appeared as an available, but private, 
connection. It was labeled as “private” and, thus, potential users knowingly trespassed on an unknown 
private network. There were no authentication requirements to join. Some, but not all, businesses 
offered an accessible public Wi-Fi network to guests. At the establishments which made it available, 
people could see the business’ Wi-Fi network and our unknown private Wi-Fi network. When 
searching for a connection, users are able to view all Wi-Fi networks within range of connection, 
meaning other networks not belonging to the business or our research team were also viewable in 
some instances.
We collected data over a 16-month period between August 2015 and December 2016. Upon arrival at a 
given business, we set up our private Wi-Fi network and collected data on the physical space. Data 
collection included a simple count of the number of customers and employees in the location 
throughout the one-hour long session. Figure 1 is an example diagram of the physical location and the 
type of physical space data collected during each period. The diagrams contain information on the 
space’s physical traits, including the shape of the room, the number of entrances and exits, the size 
and positioning of tables and seats, and any employee-only areas of the location. Figure 1 also contains 
information on all people in the space, including the number of them; and, for each person, their 
perceived gender, whether an employee or guest, possession of devices-in-use, movement through and 
use of the space, arrival and departure times.
--Figure 1 About Here--
Sam ple
We visited 109 businesses but excluded 29 of them from analyses. The excluded businesses were in 
city centers, train stations, and museums that, due to their busyness, proved too difficult to reliably 
collect data on. With those excluded from the sample, we were left with 208 one-hour sessions 
(duration one hour) at 80 businesses. The average location had 20 people total during the one-hour 
session (Min=1, Max=58). On average, 17 of these people were customers (Min=1, Max=58), and 2.73 
were employees (Min=1, Max=12). The mean number of laptops is 2.30 (Min=0, Max=42.33) and the 
mean number of visible mobile devices is 3.30 (Min=0, Max=22).
Dependent Measures
When examining the data, we were interested in offline and online VSPB. To measure online VSPB, we 
constructed a dummy variable entitled Accessed Unknown Wi-Fi Network, taking the value of 1 if 
someone accessed our network, and 0 if  they did not. If  the private and unknown network was 
accessed, risky behavior was demonstrated by the user. Our measure of offline VSPB is % Devices 
CrimRxiv Situational Awareness and Public Wi-Fi Users’ Self-Protective Behaviors
12
Concealed. It captures the percentage of people (within the one-hour session) who concealed their 
devices by positioning their backs immediately to the wall or sitting more than one chair away from 
other potential network users (employees excluded).
Independent Measures
Six independent variables were measured in our second study: % Employees; % Male; Morning; 
Afternoon; Evening; and Other Network. The first independent measure % Employees shows the 
percentage of total occupants in any given business location that were employees of that location. The 
% Employees variable includes the total number of employees present at any time during our one-hour 
session. Similarly, we constructed % Male, which is the percentage of total male occupants in any given 
business location during our one-hour session. We also constructed three dummy variables to capture 
the time of day. The variable Morning took the value of 1 if  the session took place in the morning time 
(8:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.) and 0 otherwise. Likewise, the variable Afternoon (12:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.) took 
the value of 1 if  the session took place in the afternoon and 0 otherwise. Lastly, the variable Evening 
(5:00 p.m. – 8:00 p.m.), which is used as the reference category, took the value of 1 if  the session took 
place in the afternoon and 0 otherwise. To capture availability of other public Wi-Fi networks available 
at the business, we constructed a dummy variable entitled Other Network. This measure took the value 
1 if  another Wi-Fi network was available in the business and the value 0 if  no other Wi-Fi networks 
were available.
Analytic Strategy
We use Hierarchical Linear (HLM) and Hierarchical Generalized Linear (HGLM) Models (Raudenbush 
and Bryk 2002) to capture the effect of independent measures on VSPB with respect to public Wi-Fi 
networks. Overall, multilevel modeling allows for the analysis of individual behaviors within larger 
units of aggregation (i.e., neighborhoods, schools, organizations, etc.) and addresses two potential 
biases that may occur when applying ordinary regression techniques to clustered data. First, it allows 
for more accurate estimates of standard errors when cases are clustered (and potentially correlated) 
within larger units. Second, it provides estimates of the impact of cross-level interactions between the 
larger unit of aggregation characteristics and individual-level factors. Since our private Wi-Fi network 
observations are embedded within place, we use two-level linear models to predict the volume of 
concealed computer screens, and two-level logit models to estimate public Wi-Fi users’ probability to 
access the private and unknown Wi-Fi network (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). For each type of 
analysis, we specify the observation data (Level 1), while allowing for the intercept to vary across 
places (Level 2).
Results
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the variables constructed using online and offline 
observations. In 16% of the one-hour sessions, our private Wi-Fi network was accessed by persons at 
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the business. The average percentage of people who concealed their screen in these businesses was 
9.19%. The average percentage of employees (versus customers) across businesses was 20.76%. Males 
and females visited the businesses at nearly even rates, with males making up nearly half (48.88%) of 
the population. Most of the businesses (80%) provided a Wi-Fi network (Other Network) for guests to 
access.
--Table 4 About Here--
Table 5 presents results from the multilevel linear and logit regression analyses. For Model 1, the 
estimates show that the effect of % Employees on the probability that the dependent variable takes a 
value of 1 (respondents access an unknown private Wi-Fi network) is negative (-6%) and significant 
(p<0.05). Thus, the higher the percentage of employees (versus guests) in a location, the higher the 
level of online VSPB. Model 2’s estimates, which adds control variables, imply a similar effect of the % 
Employees on respondents accessing a private and unknown Wi-Fi networks (-7%) and is significant 
(p<0.01). In addition, these estimates show that the effect of Other Network on the probability of 
accessing unknown networks is negative (-26%) and significant (p<0.05). Therefore, the higher the 
percentage of employees (versus guests) in a location and the ability to access other publicly available 
networks (versus no other publicly available networks), the higher the level of online VSPB.
--Table 5 About Here--
For Models 3 and 4 of Table 5, the mean effect of the % Employees measure on the percentage of users 
concealing the device screens (% Devices Concealed) is positive and significant (p<0.05). These model 
estimates suggest that a higher proportion of employees to guests makes the latter more likely to 
conceal their devices. Additionally, Model 4 shows that being male increases the likelihood of a person 
concealing their device (p<0.05). From these results, we see overall that more employees relative to 
guests leads to more offline and online VSPB.
Discussion
The Internet facilitates ways for criminals to easily access valuable information. With occurrences of 
cyber-criminality on the rise year after year (Norton 2017) and hackers attacking computers and 
networks at a near-constant rate (Cukier 2007), in conjunction with law enforcements’ inability to 
combat these occurrences (Burruss et al. 2019), it is increasingly important to find ways to mitigate 
cyber-crime. Public Wi-Fi networks are often unsecured, which make their users vulnerable to 
attacks. Worse yet, most users of these public Wi-Fi networks believe their information is safe while 
using them (Norton 2017). This unawareness increases the chance of users becoming online victims 
(Balebako et al. 2011).
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In this article, we contribute to the (cyber-)criminological literature by providing insight into whether 
users of public Wi-Fi networks are aware of the risks and use online and offline VSPB. We share 
findings from two studies, the first being survey-based and the second a field study, used to test three 
hypotheses. As detailed above and discussed below, findings support all three hypotheses. In line with 
the first hypothesis, we find that people who are more situationally aware are more likely to use public 
Wi-Fi networks. In support of our second hypothesis, we find that users of public Wi-Fi who exhibit SA 
are significantly more likely to conceal their devices and significantly less likely to visit email and 
banking websites when using a public Wi-Fi network. In other words, situationally aware people are 
more likely to engage in VSPB.
These findings indicate that SA is vital to VSPB. It follows that a practical implication of the results is 
that raising SA should reduce online victimization. SA training could be incorporated into computer 
training efforts, for example. Additionally, SA could be raised in the immediate by posting 
notifications in the vicinity of public Wi-Fi networks. To ensure people understand the risk, such 
training and notices should specify that public Wi-Fi networks put their data at risk.
The second study tested our third research hypothesis. Using a field study, we examined whether the 
higher the percentage of employees (place managers) in a public Wi-Fi network location increased the 
VSPB of Wi-Fi users. We find that more employees relative to guests is associated with less use of our 
private Wi-Fi network and more device concealment.
These findings demonstrate the importance of employee or place manager presence because it 
increases the likelihood of people not only protecting themselves offline by concealing their screens 
but also protecting themselves online by avoiding unknown networks. It could be that this relationship 
is explained because more employees makes it easier to obtain the business’ Wi-Fi network password 
or confirm the Wi-Fi network’s legitimacy. Moreover, this social milieu could lead public Wi-Fi users to 
be more sensitive to or otherwise aware of risk, making them less likely to access our network. A 
further explanation is that because our Wi-Fi network was marked private, people in its vicinity were 
more fearful of trespassing when there was a proportionately larger number of employees surveilling 
the location. In regard to offline behavior, the presence of employees may make the location more 
crowded, which could incentivize users to better protect themselves physically from observation 
attacks by protecting their screens; alternatively, employees may advise the users of such actions.
From testing these hypotheses, we uncovered other interesting patterns. People who were more 
proficient with computers (programming experience) reported using public Wi-Fi significantly less 
(50%). Perhaps those with computer skills are more familiar with the associated risk, and thus avoid 
public Wi-Fi networks in favor of other options such as personal Wi-Fi hotspots. This finding indicates 
that the more users become proficient with computers, the more aware they are of the risks involved 
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in using them. This can help organizations when trying to identify, and thus prioritize, which 
employees are in most need of security training.
Finally, in our second study, we see that when a business offers a Wi-Fi network in their location for 
their customers, the likelihood of those users utilizing an unknown Wi-Fi network in that location is 
significantly reduced. Therefore, it may be worthwhile for governments or businesses to consider 
installing their own secure public Wi-Fi networks in locations where users would expect Wi-Fi 
networks. This can be done to reduce the occurrence of Wi-Fi users availing of unknown Wi-Fi 
networks in public places and putting themselves at risk.
Implications for Research
These findings substantiate and extend three sets of criminological inquiry: the relevance of the SCP 
perspective in understanding how to reduce attacks on users of public Wi-Fi (Chen and Zahedi 2016; 
Clarke 1997; Reyns 2010; Welsh et al. 2010); the types of users that employ VSPB while using public Wi-
Fi (Bachman et al. 2002; Klasnja et al. 2009; Watts 2016); and, the environmental cues that encourage 
VSPB (Bachman et al. 2002; Klasnja et al. 2009; Watts 2016). Additionally, we answer Douglas and 
Welsh’s (2020) call for additional research into the effectiveness of place managers at reducing 
opportunities for crime. Moreover, the findings contribute to the information security literature that 
has investigated cyber security from various perspectives (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Wright et al. 
2014; Wright and Marett 2010; Xiao and Benbasat 2011). In particular, we show the need to understand 
how Internet users protect themselves from physical and virtual security threats in the context of 
public Wi-Fi use (Bachman et al. 2002; Brudy et al. 2014; Klasnja et al. 2009). We extended this vein of 
research by extending the focus to offline VSPB in mitigating observation attacks, such as shoulder 
surfing.
Implications for Practice
This work also carries practical implications for providers of public Wi-Fi networks. These 
organizations should promote guests’ awareness of whether the business offers Wi-Fi access and, if  so, 
how to access it (e.g., its name and password). Our findings suggest this will naturally result from 
having more employees on site, though it could be promoted through signage. Furthermore, practical 
implications for organizations stem from the finding that more proficient computer users engage in 
more online and offline VSPB. Training and education in technology can help people become more 
aware of their security. This should be sure to include – and expanded as needed – information on the 
types and techniques of online and offline VSPB useful for preventing attacks related to the use of 
public Wi-Fi networks.
Governments across the world are turning to the idea of nudging people into making safer decisions in 
many aspects of life. In fact, some governments are creating ‘nudge units’, due to growing recognition 
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that almost every policy issue has a human-behavioral aspect at its core. For example, the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST) of the US government was founded to use insights from psychology, 
behavioral economics, and other decision sciences to improve federal programs and operations. 
Similar teams are found in Canada, Germany, Israel, New South Wales, Singapore, and the UK 
(Halpern 2015; Marron 2015). Our findings suggest that the idea of nudging people into making safer 
decisions is applicable in not only physical spaces, but also cyberspace.
Limitations
Although the findings presented above have theoretical and policy implications, both studies have 
notable limitations. Our first study, which employed a sample of college students in Maryland, suffers 
from issues related to omitted variable bias, external validity, response bias, and the inability to 
establish causal relationships. It is likely that other variables, which are not included in the model, 
influence behavioral patterns while using public Wi-Fi networks. In this case, the coefficients and 
standard errors presented are bias. Additionally, we employ a relatively small sample of college 
students attending the same university in the state of Maryland. It is likely, and even probable, that 
findings drawn using such a sample are not generalizable to the national population. It is also possible 
that our respondents did not answer the survey questions truthfully. They may have purposefully 
provided falsified information or simply provided misinformation by mistake. Lastly, the cross-
sectional nature of our study prevents estimating causal relationships.
Our second study, which utilizes field data, also suffers from notable limitations. Similar to the first 
study, we utilize cross-sectional data, which limits are ability to make causal statements. Additionally, 
the findings presented reflect the behavior of public Wi-Fi users within a 60 mile radius of the 
University of Maryland campus. It is unclear if these findings are generalizable to public Wi-Fi users 
in other locations. One may also argue the study suffers from issues concerning ethics. The research 
team did not request permission from the managers of the businesses in which the Wi-Fi networks 
were deployed, nor did we request consent from the people visiting the establishment during our 
observations. However, neither our research team nor the institutional review board viewed this as an 
ethical issue since personally identifiable data was not collected. Moreover, the estimated models 
likely suffer from omitted variable bias. Relatedly, our measures of SA are restricted to people being 
aware of their surroundings (i.e., being aware of the presence of place managers in a location).
Building upon the current study, research should examine whether the presence of physical items 
within an environment, other than people, increases VSPBs. Such items include physical 
notifications/signs, both in the online and offline environment. As alluded to above, signage may 
remind or alert people to increase their security measures (i.e., be aware of who is sitting or standing 
nearby, do not send sensitive information over public Wi-Fi networks, or there is no public Wi-Fi 
network associated with the location in question). Offline and online signs act as deterrents to persons 
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who may engage in risky behavior (Howell et al. 2017; Jacques 2019; Maimon et al. 2014). Future 
research could investigate whether a similar effect occur in in the context of Wi-Fi networks.
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Study 1).
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variables:     
Uses Public Wi-Fi 
Network
0.23 0.42 0 1
Check Online 
Personal Accounts on 
Public Wi-Fi 
Network
0.43 0.49 0 1
Conceal Device 
Screen While Using 
Public Wi-Fi 
Network
0.88 0.31 0 1
Independent variables:     
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Situational 
Awareness
3.28 1.12 1 5
Male 0.49 0.50 0 1
Age 19.60 1.90 17 39
Annual Income 1.31 1.43 1 12
Programing 
Experience
0.36 0.65 0 3
Note. n = 749
Table 2. Public Wi-Fi Use and Adoption of Online and Offline Self-Protective Behaviors Regressed Over Individual’s 
Situational Awareness (Study 1).
Variables Uses Public Wi-Fi Network
Model 1
Check Online Personal Accounts 
on Public Wi-Fi Network
Model 2
Conceals Device Screen While 
Using Public Wi-Fi Network
Model 3
b (SE) OR b (SE) OR b (SE) OR
Situational 
Awareness
†
0.13 (0.02) 1.14 †-0.12 (0.07) 0.88 **0.52 (0.11) 1.68
Male *-0.44 (0.19) 0.64 0.21 (0.17) 1.23 0.01 (0.24) 1.01
Age 0.04 (0.04) 1.04 -0.05 (0.05) 0.95 -0.05 (0.05) 0.95
Annual 
Income
0.08 (0.05) 1.08 0.01 (0.05) 1.01 -0.04 (0.07) 0.95
Programing 
Experience
*-0.98 (0.52) 0.83 **-0.41 (0.15) 0.66 -0.11 (0.27) 0.89
Constant 2.77 (2.70)  1.02 (0.97)  1.51 (1.10)  
Pseudo R2 0.03  0.02  0.05  
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Ln likelihood -378.17  -406.42  -253.99  
AIC 772.35  828.85  519.99  
Note. n = 749. b = regression coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; AIC = akaike information criterion. †p ≤ 
0.10, *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01.
Table 3. Adoption of Online and Offline Self-Protective Behaviors Regressed Over Individual’s Situational Awareness 
Among Public Wi-Fi Users Only (Study 1).
Variables Check Online Personal Accounts on Public 
Wi-Fi Network
Model 1
Conceals Device Screen While Using Public 
Wi-Fi Network
Model 2
b (SE) OR b (SE) OR
Situational 
Awareness
†-0.25 (0.15) 0.78 †0.52 (0.27) 1.69
Male 0.36 (0.37) 1.43 -0.82 (0.15) 0.44
Age -0.17 (0.12) 0.84 -0.12 (0.12) 0.88
Annual Income -0.41 (0.22) 0.65 -0.14 (0.12) 0.87
Programing 
Experience
-0.46 (0.33) 0.63 0.21 (0.49) 1.23
Constant †4.35 (2.09)  3.74 (2.66)  
Pseudo R2 0.07  0.09  
Ln likelihood -107.14  -46.01  
AIC 226.28  104.02  
Note. n = 164. b = regression coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; AIC = akaike information criterion. †p ≤ 
0.10, *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (Study 2).
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variables:     
Accessed Unknown 
Wi-Fi Network
0.16 0.37 0 1
% Devices Concealed 9.19 20.84 0 100
Independent Variables:     
% Employees 20.76 14.62 0 100
% Male 48.88 15.18 0 100
Morning 0.33 0.47 0 1
Afternoon 0.38 0.48 0 1
Evening 0.29 0.45 0 1
Other Network 0.80 0.40 0 1
Note. n = 208 (across 
80 locations)
    
Table 5. Logit and Linear Multilevel Random Intercept Models of Honeypot Sessions (Study 2).
Variables Accessed Unknown Wi-Fi Network % Devices Concealed
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b (SE) OR b (SE) OR b (SE) b (SE)
% Employees *-0.06 (0.02) 0.94 **-0.07 (0.03) 0.92 *0.28 (0.14) *0.32 (0.14)
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Figure
Figure 1. Observations Recorded During a One Hour Honeypot Session (Study 2).
% Male   0.01 (0.02) 1.01  *0.20 (0.11)
Morning a   0.52 (0.56) 1.67  5.74 (3.11)
Afternoon a   0.30 (0.55) 1.34  2.10 (2.89)
Other 
Network
  *-1.26 (0.64) 0.28  4.32 (5.19)
Constant *-0.98 (0.52)  -0.65 (1.19)  4.52 (0.35) -12.41 (0.82)
Rho 0.33  0.29  0.53 0.49
Df 3  7  4 8
Ln likelihood -85.96  -83.26  -754.46 -750.22
AIC 177.93  180.53  1516.94 1516.44
Note. n = 208 (across 80 locations). b = regression coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; Rho = Spearman’s 
Rho; Df = degrees of freedom; AIC = akaike information criterion. †p ≤ 0.10, *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01. a Reference 
category = Evening
